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Institute for Human Rights (GIHR) in 2007 and is cur-
rently Senior Policy Advisor in the field of develop-
ment cooperation policy. Her chief areas of focus are 
the accountability of state donors and the promotion 
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Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit ad-
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institutions engaged in development cooperation. Be-
fore joining GIHR she spent several years working for 
a private development cooperation consultancy and 
for the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe. 
The Institute
The German Institute for Human Rights is the inde-
pendent National Human Rights Institution in Ger-
many. It is accredited according to the Paris Princi-
ples of the United Nations (A-status). The Institute’s 
activities include the provision of advice on policy 
issues, human rights education, information and doc-
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the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
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3On Terminology
The countries with which Germany engages in devel-
opment cooperation are referred to here as “partner 
countries” (or partner country in the singular), as this 
has become the generally accepted term, and from a 
human rights point of view cooperation is a worth-
while goal. The author is aware that the word “part-
nership” suggests cooperation between equals, which 
for various reasons is not always the case in develop-
ment cooperation. 
The term “donors” is used for development partners 
offering financial or technical cooperation to partner 
countries.
The author would like to thank Rebecca Walter for 
her helpful support in compiling this paper; Korinna 
Horta, Heike Rabe and Anna Würth for their valuable 
comments; and various members of civil society, the 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
the GIZ and the KfW Development Bank for their in-
spiring discussions.
4Summary
Development cooperation is intended to further hu-
man rights. While it often does, it does not do so by 
default. There have been complaints about develop-
ment pro grammes in partner countries supported by 
German development cooperation, often because of 
alleged forced resettlements which do not comply 
with international human rights. Some of the com-
plaints have been dealt with before the United Na-
tions Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. The Committee has recommend ed that the 
German government ensure its devel opment cooper-
ation policies promote economic, social and cultural 
rights and do not result in their violation. 
Governments of countries supported by development 
cooperation are primarily responsible for the human 
rights compliance of their development programmes. 
However, donor countries contribute financial or tech-
nical resources to these pro grammes without which 
the countries in question would not be able to im-
plement them at all. This implies that donor countries 
share responsibility for the impact and side-effects of 
develop ment cooperation and for its compliance with 
human rights. Unlike development banks, for exam-
ple, Germany does not have a central, independent 
and transpar ent mechanism to investigate complaints 
arising from its bilateral development coopera tion 
and to publish the results of such investigations. Such 
a mechanism would give those affected by develop-
ment cooperation a voice. In addition, it would enable 
the outcomes to which donors have contributed to be 
assessed from a human rights point of view. This is 
what distinguishes a human rights-based complaints 
mechanism from evalu ations or preliminary impact 
assessments, which examine the extent to which pro-
grammes have achieved development goals and are 
usually initiated by the donors themselves. 
This publication argues that human rights consider-
ations require the introduction of such a complaints 
mechanism because it would close the existing ac-
countability gap in German bilater al development 
cooperation. From a human rights per spective, a 
complaints mechanism for development cooperation 
is grounded in extraterritorial human rights obliga-
tions and the ensuing obligation of states to provide 
for effective redress. Demands for donor accountabil-
ity have become a central issue, as under scored by 
the proposal of the German CSO umbrella organisa-
tion Forum Menschenrechte for a human rights com-
plaints mechanism for bilateral development cooper-
ation as well as by discussions concerning post-2015 
development goals. 
In terms of development policy, such a mechanism 
would lead to more ownership by allowing control 
of impacts at the local level. Feedback from affected 
parties would also enable donors to address the risks 
of their engagement early on in the process and adapt 
their programmes accordingly. Thus, a complaints 
mechanism would ideally be an instrument of preven-
tive risk management, hence helping to ensure that 
human rights infringe ments do not occur in the first 
place. Furthermore, a complaints mechanism might 
also facilitate dialogue with civil society, both in Ger-
many and in partner countries, and hence raise the 
debate about the opportunities and limits of develop-
ment cooperation to a qualitatively new level. In ad-
dition, a systematic anal ysis of individual cases could 
also further the legal debate about the scope and 
limits of donor states’ extra -territorial obligations. 
Doubts arising among partner institutions in the part-
ner countries are challenges that human rights-based 
development cooperation must face and address. 
The current standard procedure consists of two stag-
es. First, a problem-solv ing process conducted in the 
country where a development cooperation project is 
being implemented; and second, a centralised, inde-
pendent and transparent human rights compliance 
review. While the former is a kind of confidential me-
diation process, the latter is an independent proce-
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dure whose steps and out comes are documented in a 
transparent manner. The former provides development 
organisations with the opportunity to search expe-
ditiously and in good faith for a jointly acceptable 
solution. The latter is resorted to in cases where the 
parties concerned fail to reach agreement or where 
human rights infringements are irreversible. Accord-
ing to their own statements, the implementing agen-
cies, the GIZ and the development bank of the KfW, 
both have confidential internal mechanisms for deal-
ing with complaints. These could be further developed 
into problem-solving mechanisms. 
The German Institute for Human Rights recommends 
to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development that it establishes such a complaints 
mechanism, including an independent, transparent 
and public compliance review, by the middle of the 
eighteenth legislative term. It encourages the imple-
menting agencies, in par ticular the GIZ and the KfW, 
to make use of the opportunities such a complaints 
mechanism would offer and to work con structively 
towards its establishment. Concurrently the agencies 
should structure their own internal procedures so 
as to include a problem-solving process in line with 
international good practice and Germany’s human 
rights obligations. Last but not least, it recommends 
to the German Bundestag’s Committee on Economic 
Cooperation and Development and the Committee 
on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid to request 
from the German Ministry for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development an annual report summarising 
complaints arising from Germany’s development pro-
grammes and to discuss this report in a joint public 
committee session. 
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Human Rights Require Accountability 
Why German development cooperation needs a human rights 
complaints mechanism
1 BMZ (2011), Human Rights in German Development Policy. BMZ Strategy Paper, p. 12. http://www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_ 
publication/strategies/Strategiepapier305_04_2011.pdf (PDF, 484 KB) [accessed 28.08.2013].
2 Ibid., p. 21. “Mechanisms of accountability which can be accessed by individuals or groups if they consider that their human rights have 
been infringed, play an important role in human rights implementation. This applies in the context of development cooperation in the 
partner countries as well as in Germany. For that reason, and also drawing on experience gained by other donors, the possibility of setting 
up a human rights complaint mechanism is being considered by BMZ. The assessment will focus on strengthening ownership by the 
partner countries and safeguarding access for civil society organisations.”
3 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2011), 46th session, UN doc. E/C.12/2011/SR.10, nos. 6 and 14.
4 Parallel Report to the 5th Periodic Report of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, http://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF-Dateien/Pakte_Konven-
tionen/ICESCR/icescr_state_report_germany_5_2008_parallel_Alliance_en.pdf (PDF, 646 KB) [accessed 27.08.2013].
5 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2011), 46th session, UN doc. E/C.12/2011/SR.10, no. 11. 
6 German Institute for Human Rights / Monika Lüke (2013), Human Rights Assessment of the German-Cambodian Land Rights Pro gram, 
http://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/uploads/tx_commerce/Study_Human_Rights_Assessment_of_the_German_Cambodian_
Land_Rights_Program.pdf (PDF, 4,7 MB) [accessed 19.11.2013].
1 Current State of Affairs 
The first binding human rights concept in German de-
velopment cooperation policy was issued by the Ger-
man Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ) in May 2011. It establishes ac-
countability as a component of a human rights based 
approach. Accountability is considered to promote 
cooperation between civil society and state structures 
and hence yield better development outcomes.1 While 
the call for accountability is directed first and fore-
most at Germany’s partner countries, the BMZ does 
not exempt itself from this endeavour. Based on the 
experiences of other donor countries, the BMZ has set 
out to examine whether a human rights-based com-
plaints mechanism can be implemented with a view 
to furthering accountability.2
A complaints mechanism of this kind would allow 
people in partner countries to lodge complaints di-
rectly with Germany as a donor country in cases 
where they have been negatively affected by German 
development cooperation programmes or if they have 
good reason to fear that this would be the case in 
the future. Article 2 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights obliges states to ensure that 
anyone whose rights have been violated “shall have 
an effective remedy”. It is recognised that states act-
ing outside their own territories, in other words, with 
respect to populations of third countries, are funda-
mentally bound to observe human rights. 
The realisation of these extra-territorial state obli-
gations is a matter of some urgency: in the German 
state report on the Convention on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights 2010/2011,3 German civil society 
organisations (CSOs) criticised German development 
cooperation with Cambodia.4 Following the report, 
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultur-
al Rights called on Germany to organise its develop-
ment cooperation to ensure that it furthered rather 
than violated human rights.5 In 2012 the BMZ asked 
the German Institute for Human Rights to carry out 
an independent, human rights-based assessment of 
land rights in the German-Cambodian programme. 
It concluded with recommendations for future pro-
grammes, including the enshrinement of complaints 
mechanism.6
Since 2011 the German Institute for Human Rights 
(GIHR) has outlined its position on the necessity and 
value of establishing such a mechanism, what form 
it should take and where it might be located. It has 
also held discussions with CSOs, the BMZ and imple-
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7 See the proposal submitted by the German human rights umbrella CSO Forum Menschenrechte in October 2012: Forum Menschenrechte 
(2012), Proposal for a Human Rights Complaint Mechanism for German Development Cooperation, http://www.forum-menschenrechte.
de/cms/upload/PDF/ab_02_2012/1210_FMR_Proposal_HR_Complaint_Procedure_Dev_Coop.pdf (PDF, 55 KB, not barrier-free) [accessed 
24.10.2013].
8 Since there are no independent studies and no examinations of blog discussions in the secondary literature on this subject, I refer here 
and elsewhere to blogs. As well as the cases of Cambodia, Ghana and Namibia described in this publication, see also, for example, the 
publication of the German CSO urgewald e.V. on KfW’s involvement in a waste-burning project to in Beijing: Entwicklungspolitik online/
urgewald, KfW soll Müllverbrennung in Peking nicht finanzieren [Internet] Deutschland. 30.8.2012 [cited on 6.11.2013]. http://www.epo.
de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8717:kfw-soll-muellverbrennung-in-peking-nicht-finanzieren&catid=28&Item-
id=70 [accessed 6.11.2013]. 
9 Brot für die Welt/FIAN (2001), Parallel Report to the 4th Periodic Report of the Federal Republic of Germany to the UN Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights. Germany’s Fulfillment of Its International Obligations in accordance with the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (IPwskR). Focus: The Right to a Proper Diet, http://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/fileadmin/
user_upload/PDF-Dateien/Pakte_Konventionen/ICESCR/icescr_state_report_germany_4_2000_parallel_de.pdf (PDF, 433 KB) [accessed 
27.08.2013]; Brot für die Welt, FIAN Deutschland, GegenStrömung, Deutsche Kommission Justitia et Pax, MISEREOR, urgewald (2011), 
Parallel Report in Response to the 5th Periodic Report of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Implementation of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, http://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF-Dateien/Pa-
kte_Konventionen/ICESCR/icescr_state_report_germany_5_2008_parallel_Alliance_en.pdf (PDF, 647 KB) [accessed 27.08.2013].
menting agencies.7 Chapter 2 of this policy paper pre-
sents the GIHR’s thoughts on this matter from a hu-
man rights and development policy perspective, while 
Chapter 3 outlines the human rights basis upon which 
such a complaints mechanism might be established. 
Chapter 4 considers the possible challenges that Ger-
man development cooperation might encounter in 
introducing such a mechanism and how these could 
be addressed. Chapter 5 proposes how such a mecha-
nism might be structured, while Chapter 6 concludes 
with recommendations for action to the German gov-
ernment, development organisations and the German 
parliament. 
2 Why a Complaints Mechanism? 
Why should donors who voluntarily donate funds for 
the development of foreign countries also be held ac-
countable for the consequences of these payments? 
Doesn’t the partner country bear sole responsibility 
for the use of development funds and the conse-
quences thereof? 
It is indeed the governments of partner countries who 
are responsible for development projects, with donor 
countries contributing financial resources or support-
ing the process by means of technical assistance. But 
in many cases specific projects are only made possible 
at all through these external resources. It thus follows 
that donors carry partial responsibility for the effects 
and side-effects of development projects.
2.1 The need for a complaints mechanism 
Good intentions do not always produce good results. 
Development cooperation ought to benefit the devel-
opment of a country, and in many cases it does, but it 
does not do so by default. 
The realisation of a human rights-based approach to 
development cooperation that can link human rights 
and development cooperation at both a conception-
al and a practical level illustrates how development 
cooperation at its best can substantially support hu-
man rights – and conversely how human rights can 
strengthen good, sustainable development coopera-
tion.
Yet some development cooperation projects do little 
to promote human rights even if they do not neces-
sarily violate them. Contrary to a widely held view, 
not every road-building project promotes the rights of 
women simply because they use that particular road 
from time to time. 
Finally, some projects may indeed result in human 
rights violations. The complaints received in recent 
decades through the complaints mechanism of the 
World Bank (referred to henceforth as the Inspection 
Panel), show that major infrastructure projects in par-
ticular often have an extremely negative impact on 
human rights – for example through forced resettle-
ment or damage to health caused by environmental 
pollution. A number of similar complaints have been 
received in connection with other development pro-
jects involving German funding.8 Two of them have 
already been examined by the Committee on Econom-
ic, Social and Cultural Rights of the United Nations. 
In 2001 and 2011 German CSOs identified human 
rights infringements in Ghana and Cambodia, re-
spectively, in two reports to the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.9 In the case of 
Ghana, German development cooperation agencies 
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10 On Cambodia, see also Lüke (2013), see note 6. 
11 On USAID and Azerbaijan see the following blogs: Ali Huseynov, In Mutatione Fortitudo, “1.5 million dollars of US taxpay ers’ mon-
ey granted to Azerbaijani GONGO” [Internet]. Baku, Azerbaijan, 28 November 2012 [cited on 26.08.2013]. http://blog.novruzov.az/ 
2012/11/15-million-us-taxpayers-money-granted.html [accessed 24.10.2013]; Turan News Agency. Interview: “U.S. Funds Pro-gov-
ernment Structures in Azerbaijan” [Internet]. Baku, Azerbaijan, 1 May 2013 [cited on 26.08.2013]. http://www.contact.az/docs/2013/ 
Politics/050100034617en.htm#.UmkN5IFoHjg [accessed 24.10.2013]; USAID (2013), press release: “Human Rights Discussion Promoted 
in the Regions”. https://www.usaid.gov/azerbaijan/press-releases/human-rights-discussion-promoted-regions [accessed 26.08.2013]. On 
the use of blogs see note 8.
12 See the blog contribution on amerika 21.de. News and analyses from Latin America and the Caribbean. Mexiko, “Deutsche Poli zeihilfe könnte 
organisiertes Verbrechen fördern” [Internet], Berlin, 05.05.2011 [cited on 26.08.2013]. https://amerika21.de/meldung/2011/05/29611/ 
polizeihilfe-deutschland-mexik [accessed 24.10.2013]. On the use of blogs see note 8. Germany’s aid to the Mexican police was the subject 
of a minor interpellation in the Bundestag: Deutscher Bundestag (2012), Antwort der Bundesregierung auf Kleine Anfrage: “Gewalteskal-
ation und Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Mexiko”. Document no. 17/9116. http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/091/1709116.pdf (PDF, 
235 KB) [accessed 26.08.2013] FIAN Deutschland, “DEG reagiert und stoppt Kredit an honduranischen Palmölpro duzenten – FIAN begrüßt 
die menschenrechtskonforme Entscheidung”, 14.4.2011, http://www.fian.de/artikelansicht/2011-04-14-deg-reagiert-und-stoppt-kredit-
an- honduranischen-palmoelproduzenten-fian-begruesst-die-menschenrechtskonforme-entscheidung/ [accessed 10.12.2013].
13 See the Human Rights Watch report (2010), Development without Freedom, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/10/19/development-with-
out-freedom-0 [accessed 26.08.2013] 
had provided gold mine operators with loans via the 
Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG). In Cam-
bodia the GIZ supported the Cambodian government 
and administration in the technical and administra-
tive implementation of land management policy. It 
also helped to prepare the legal basis for the project 
and to establish and qualify some of the institutions 
concerned with land questions. 
In both cases the projects resulted in forced reset-
tlement, something which in no way conformed with 
the provisions of the Convention on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights concerning proportionality, prior 
consultation and appropriate compensation. Those 
who were resettled had no access to effective legal 
redress.10 
Even though donors take various steps to try to avoid 
human rights infringements in development coopera-
tion projects and to achieve their development coop-
eration goals, it is always possible that projects will 
lead to such human rights infringements. This can 
happen in a number of different ways, as the follow-
ing categories of cases show: 
Cooperation partners are chosen who are involved 
in restricting human rights. Such an accusation, 
for example, was levelled by a group of Azerbaijani 
CSOs against the U.S. development agency USAID. 
The group claimed that in 2012 USAID had given 1.5 
million U.S. dollars to an Azerbaijani organisation 
that, though formally registered as a CSO, was ac-
tually headed by the chairman of the Committee of 
the Azerbaijani Parliament on Legal Policy and State 
Building. The chairman of this committee was – like 
most members of the parliament –a member of the 
governing party. It was chiefly this committee that 
had been responsible for passing laws restricting civil 
and political rights in Azerbaijan.11 Similar accusa-
tions were levelled at the German Interior Ministry’s 
support for the Mexican police as well as at the con-
tractual relationship between the DEG and its Hondu-
ran business partners. Since then the DEG has ceased 
making loan payments to these partners.12
The responsible agencies of the partner country use 
development cooperation money to strengthen the 
ruling party. This was the finding of a Human Rights 
Watch report on Ethiopia in 2010. The report traced 
how social programmes had been used to give pref-
erential treatment to members of the governing party 
and exclude members of the opposition from social 
benefits.13 
Private service providers cause human rights in-
fringements: Private service providers usually have a 
contractual relationship with the cooperation partner 
or agency in the country in question. Possible conse-
quences of such arrangements might be, for example, 
that a private land surveying agency receives bribes 
to carry out surveys that favour particular parties. An-
other example might be private security companies 
whose employees harass local populations. 
Failure to properly assess possible consequences 
during the planning phase: In this case, development 
cooperation professionals underestimate the impact 
of their development concept or else fail to take steps 
to reduce the risk of human rights infringements. 
Sometimes it is necessary to take risks, of course, but 
then an assessment of the possible human rights con-
sequences must be performed that outlines not only 
the desired effects but also the possible negative im-
pact. The assessment should suggest how these might 
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be reduced and establish critical thresholds at which 
development cooperation agencies should halt or 
withdraw from projects.
Even though the project has been well planned and 
financial resources have already been pledged, in-
fringements occur at the implementation stage: 
This often happens when the German government’s 
negotiating partners are not the same people who are 
later responsible for implementation and subordinate 
authorities or other ministries take their place. This, 
at any rate, was what happened in the Cambodian 
project mentioned above.14 CSOs in Namibia suggest 
that the state of affairs is similar in that country.15 In 
this case the GIZ is helping the land ministry to carry 
out a land reform and to allocate land titles. Decisions 
about who among the indigenous populations is ac-
tually entitled to a land title are, however, taken by a 
different ministry. As a consequence of the land re-
form, not only did those deemed ineligible not receive 
any land titles, but in some cases they were forced to 
cede them to new owners. 
The last-mentioned situation is probably the most 
common: at the point when negotiations were con-
ducted with the partner government, the human 
rights infringements could not have been foreseen, 
since they only occurred at the implementation stage. 
They were perpetrated by actors with whom Germany 
had neither negotiated nor had access to their poli-
cies and implementation practices. Often a consider-
able amount of time elapses between the planning of 
a project and its implementation, meaning that hu-
man rights infringements sometimes ensue as a result 
of changes in the institutional, economic or political 
context. 
The question of responsibility may be different if a 
donor participates in programmes in which  – al-
though unintended by the donor – infringements of 
human rights occur with the donor’s knowledge. In 
this case it might be said that the donor is “tolerating” 
the infringements. Would a donor be able to justi-
fy his actions in such cases by claiming that he had 
withdrawn to an unproblematic field – in the cases 
of Cambodia and Namibia to administrative support 
for the land registry system, which did indeed secure 
property ownership for many people? And how should 
we judge cases in which donors have underestimat-
ed the impact on affected parties? Or cases in which 
measures initiated by donors to compensate certain 
disadvantaged groups fail to have as comprehensive 
an impact as intended? 
2.2 What are the origins of human rights 
infringements through development 
cooperation?
The causes of human rights infringements during 
implementation of development cooperation pro-
grammes lie not only in the programmes’ conception 
and implementation. Usually they are also based on 
unvoiced discursive assumptions and the real-life 
conditions in which development cooperation policy 
is put into practice. These create a particular perspec-
tive on development or establish incentives that can 
lead to the inadequate consideration of human rights 
or to affected parties being insufficiently heard – or 
indeed not heard at all  – during project implemen-
tation: 
The prevailing understanding of development is 
one-sided: the word “development” conjures up 
notions of progress and improvement  – which is 
measured based upon the average outcome for all 
concerned. These might take the form of more envi-
ronmentally friendly energy generation, legal security 
provided by the introduction of a land registry or the 
provision of an adequate water supply. Most of the 
time people are less aware that these goals – as de-
sirable as they may seem after considering all possible 
aspects – may result in infringements against certain 
individuals, groups of people or regions that are dis-
proportionate to the benefits and that these are not 
adequately addressed by the governments of Germa-
ny’s partner countries. Building a dam, for example, 
may well make it necessary to resettle populations. 
Introducing land registries and demarcating proper-
ty may ignore collective ownership claims and land 
use rights or even interfere with nomads’ way of life. 
A water supply system could even be restructured in 
14 In Cambodia the German government negotiated with the Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board at the Council for the De-
velopment of Cambodia (CRDB/CDC). The implementation partner was the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construc-
tion. German development cooperation was not directly involved in human rights infringements, but acted as a technical, administrative 
and legal consultant and supported the establishment of the participating institutions.
15 See the blog by Rebecca Sommer, Minority Voices Newsroom. “Namibia: German GIZ Directly Engaged in Dispossessing Indigenous Peo-
ples of Their Lands and Territories” [Internet] Namibia, 30 March 2013 [cited on 26.08.2013]. http://minorityvoices.org/news.php/fr/1402/
namibia-german-giz-directly-engaged-with-dispossessing-indigenous-peoples-of-their-lands-and-territo [accessed 24.10.2013]. On 
the use of blogs see note 8.
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such a way that in absolute terms the poor pay more 
for water than the middle classes. 
Development projects tend to be viewed from a 
technical or economic perspective. Projects like 
building a hospital or a road, however, cannot be as-
sessed independently of the general human rights sit-
uation. The Inspection Panel of the World Bank made 
it clear in its report on the oil pipeline between Chad 
and Cameroon that, given the major restrictions on 
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly in 
those countries, it was questionable whether the free 
and informed consultations stipulated by the World 
Bank could be conducted in the manner desired.16
State development cooperation procedures focus on 
supporting state structures in the partner country. 
Human rights infringements often have their origins 
in the partner country’s faulty planning and/or imple-
mentation of the project. The reason for this may be a 
lack of capacity or else simply a lack of political will. 
Development project planning and implementation 
and political dialogue are, however, based on the as-
sumption that the governments of partner countries 
will ensure sufficient participation, that they will as 
a rule act in the interests of their own populations 
and that they will cease to practice policies that vi-
olate human rights when suggested to do so by the 
donor countries. This ignores the fact that it is pre-
cisely those in responsible positions in partner gov-
ernments who may have little interest in safeguarding 
human rights, making them unreceptive to advice in 
this respect. Donors may well fail to see this initially. 
They might simply underestimate the problems or else 
give the partner country’s government the benefit of 
the doubt. Alternatively they may even accept such 
violations because of their own economic or security 
policy interests.17
International development policy establishes incen-
tives for projects with high risks for human rights, 
particularly in emerging economies. Donors have 
declared on several occasions that they wish to spend 
0.7 percent of GDP on development cooperation in 
the long-term. This would include anything that qual-
ifies as official development assistance (ODA), pri-
marily contributions that donors provide themselves. 
In recent years, however, various forms of “mixed fi-
nancing” have become more prevalent, including in-
terest-subsidised loans. Here, for example, the BMZ 
channels funds to the KfW development bank, which 
in turn arranges a loan to the government of the part-
ner country out of the KfW’s market funds. The money 
from the BMZ allows the interest rate to be pushed so 
far below the market rate that the entire loan counts 
as ODA. Put another way, a contribution from the 
BMZ of, say, 20 million euros will allow a loan to the 
partner country that is three to six times higher to be 
counted as ODA.18 This kind of funding is of particular 
interest for projects in threshold countries, which are 
capable of taking out and repaying loans, rather than 
countries to which development funds are given with-
out any repayment obligation. Also attractive are fi-
nance-intensive, major infrastructure projects, which 
can visibly increase a donor country’s ODA share. The 
prospect of having such infrastructure projects, such 
as for example energy generation projects  – which 
tend to carry risks for human rights  – classified as 
ODA projects may be so attractive that human rights 
considerations recede into the background during 
planning and implementation. This may be the case 
for the BMZ, as the politically responsible body, as 
well as for the implementing agencies. 
2.3 How a complaints mechanism could 
address this situation – and its other 
advantages 
A complaints mechanism could further high-quality 
development cooperation and facilitate its commu-
nication both in Germany and abroad. It would al-
16 See Maartje Van Putten (2008), Policing the Banks. Accountability Mechanisms for the Financial Sector (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Uni-
versity Press), p. 41; World Bank Inspection Panel (2001), Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (Loan 4558-CD), 
Management of the Petroleum Economy Project (Credit 3316-CD); and Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building Project (Cred-
it 3373-CD), XVII, Paragraphs 26, 37, ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/22-Investigation%20Report%20(English).pdf (PDF, 
928 KB, not barrier-free) [accessed 10.02.2015].
17 On the subject of cooperation in the security sector, see the response of the German federal government to the minor interpellation of 26 
Oct. 2011. Drucksache 17/7470. http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/074/1707470.pdf (PDF, 247 KB) [accessed 27.08.2013].
18 See the BMZ website, Innovative Finanzierungsinstrumente. Einsatz von Marktmitteln in der finanziellen Zusammen arbeit, http://www.
bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/themen/entwicklungsfinanzierung/innovativefinanzierung/marktmittel/index.html [accessed 4.11.2013] as 
well as the following CSO publication: Jens Martens (2012), Die Wirklichkeit der Entwick lungspolitik 2012. Eine kritische Bestandsauf-
nahme der deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Twentieth report – part 2; published by Deutsche Welthungerhilfe and Terre des 
Hommes Deutschland. http://www.welthungerhilfe.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Mediathek/welthungerhilfe-wirklichkeit-entwicklung-
spolitik-20-2012-teil2.pdf (PDF, 1 MB, not barrier-free) [accessed 10.02.2015]. 
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low those who are often excluded from national and 
international development cooperation processes  – 
namely, the populations of partner countries – to have 
their say.
2.3.1 Risks can be prevented
Complaints do not represent burdensome meddling 
but a valuable instrument that allows both the BMZ 
and the implementing agencies to be become aware 
of weaknesses or risks early on in the process, ena-
bling them to remedy problems and thus encourage 
sustainable development. “Development processes 
cannot be planned on the drawing board but are sub-
ject to many different influences that those involved 
can control only partially, if at all”, was the assess-
ment of a recent KfW publication produced on the 
occasion of the World Bank’s 2014 World Develop-
ment Report.19 Every risk, it went on, also represented 
an opportunity; it concluded that, most importantly, 
risks should be consciously and efficiently addressed. 
The objectives of a mechanism for dealing with com-
plaints could hardly have been described more aptly. 
Nevertheless, it is the partner country that retains 
primary responsibility for human rights infringements 
occurring in the context of a development project. 
German development cooperation agencies – i.e. the 
BMZ as the politically responsible authority and the 
implementation agencies who bear responsibility in 
the field – can, however, influence whether and how 
donor funding is used. But it is essential to carefully 
assess the human rights risks in advance, something 
which would then help define the framework for de-
velopment cooperation engagement. This requirement 
is now clearly formulated in the BMZ’s guidelines. If 
complaints reveal weaknesses, these must be ad-
dressed in a timely fashion using all available legal 
and practical means. Whether and to what extent the 
legal options open to the BMZ and the implementing 
agencies need to be changed – in financial coopera-
tion, for example, this might be the rules governing 
the provision of funds – can be clarified in a dialogue 
with all those involved. 
Ideally a complaints mechanism should not only ad-
dress complaints but should also offer a learning ex-
perience. This would help to avoid grave infringements 
of human rights or participation in such infringements 
in the future. To what extent the involvement of a do-
nor constitutes legal liability, which would imply that 
compensation has to be paid, has yet to be clearly le-
gally determined for all the possible development co-
operation constellations. Given that the legal footing 
is not always clear and that state development co-
operation generally has a purely supportive function, 
legal liability and pursuant compensation claims are 
likely to be applied only in exceptional and particular-
ly extreme cases.20 None of the existing mechanisms 
set up by multilateral banks provides for such com-
pensation. The transparent handling of a large num-
ber of individual cases via a complaints mechanism 
would provide a basis for systematising and clarifying 
legal questions – at least in the future.
2.3.2 Local populations control 
development measures and their impact 
If a partner country fundamentally believes it has an 
obligation to safeguard human rights and if its ad-
ministration is sufficiently powerful to do this, then 
donors are likely to be able to make the necessary 
changes to development projects by entering into di-
alogue. Where this is not the case and where national 
complaint channels are inefficient or inaccessible to 
the population, a complaints mechanism instituted 
by the donor would give affected parties an oppor-
tunity to draw attention to failures in the conception 
and implementation of development projects. Devel-
opment banks already have mechanisms in place in 
order to ensure that the banks’ self-imposed due dil-
igence standards are met. These mechanisms oblige 
the staff of such banks to undertake risk assessments 
when funding development projects, to ensure the 
informed participation of affected sectors of the pop-
ulation and also to check whether all alternatives to 
forced resettlement have been explored and whether 
affected parties have received appropriate compensa-
tion. The banks’ mechanisms are not a substitute for 
19 Felix Povel (2013), “Weltentwicklungsbericht 2014: Effektives Risikomanagement fördert Entwicklung!” In: KFW-Development Re search, 
Entwicklungspolitik Kompakt, no. 17. https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/PDF/Download-Center/PDF-Dokumente-Development- 
Research/2013-10-07_EL_WDR-2014_neu.pdf (PDF, 67 KB, not barrier-free) [accessed 24.10.2013]. 
20 The only court ruling pertaining to development cooperation known to the author concerns the link between British development co-
operation and the arms trade, which the court judged to be impermissible. See the following blog with further references: Alexander 
Gordy (2004), “The implications of the Pergau dam scandal in terms of the power-play of commercial and de velopmental interests in the 
allocation of Aid-and-Trade Provision (ATP) funding”. http://pergaudam.blogspot.de/2006_02_01_archive.html [accessed 1.11.2013]. On 
the use of blogs see note 8.
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the jurisdiction of the partner countries, nor do they 
interfere with this. Rather they serve as an internal 
accountability mechanism for the donors themselves. 
Yet even if this mechanism is aimed at providing a 
formal review of the development banks’ conduct, the 
findings also provide information about the state of 
affairs in the partner country. 
CSOs can also make use of this independent public 
review and the findings it yields for their own work, 
particularly when it comes to demanding more par-
ticipation for affected parties in the decision-making 
and implementation processes surrounding develop-
ment projects. 
A complaints mechanism provides an instrument for 
target groups and those affected by development 
cooperation that they themselves can set in motion. 
This can help them achieve a stronger position, for 
it is they who decide whether proceedings should be 
instituted. The rules of procedure define the criteria 
for determining whether a complaint is admissible. 
This is designed to prevent abuse of the complaints 
mechanism and to limit complaints to relevant cases. 
A mechanism of this kind differs from project progress 
monitoring and evaluation, which are usually initiated 
by donors. Ultimately a complaints mechanism gives 
a voice to those whom development cooperation is 
supposed to benefit: the population of the partner 
country. Complaints ensuing from human rights in-
fringements can ensure a hearing for people who are 
often excluded from state development cooperation 
procedures, for development cooperation is usually 
negotiated between partner governments, and devel-
opment professionals engaged in state development 
cooperation tend to focus on working together with 
state institutions – as opposed to the public – in the 
partner country. 
2.3.3 Making development cooperation 
more effective
The experience of development banks with complaints 
mechanisms has shown that complaints can improve 
efficacy in development cooperation in the partner 
country. If, for example, affected parties report prob-
lems early on in the implementation process, adjust-
ments can be made while it is still in progress.21 In 
addition, an overall view of the reported shortcoming 
may also indicate systemic weaknesses in a donor 
organisation’s procedures and operations, which can 
then be dealt with in a more timely manner.22 It thus 
complements the remedial mechanisms that already 
exist in the partner country by providing an instru-
ment that focuses on the donor’s responsibilities. 
“Practice what you preach” is the guiding principle 
according to which donors make clear that they sub-
ject themselves to the same standards that they apply 
in their development policy and cooperation.
But even in situations where the authorities in part-
ner countries lack the political will, a complaints 
mechanism can still have an exemplary function. If a 
partner government is aware of possible human rights 
infringements and has simply accepted them, then an 
independent transparent investigation would make 
these deficits visible to the public eye in the partner 
countries. In countries where there is no guarantee 
that governments enjoy broad legitimacy or act in the 
interests of their populations, this allows donors to 
create an additional, albeit limited, space for civil so-
ciety and the population in the partner country to be 
included in the political and economic decision-mak-
ing process – particularly when it comes to the ques-
tion of how donor funding to their government should 
best be spent.23 
21 See Special Rapporteur on adequate housing Raquel Rolnik (2013), Mission to the World Bank. UN Doc. A/HRC/22/46/Add.3, no. 25: In 
an IFC project on the Philippines the agency found another solution after IFC insisted that due diligence obligations be observed. This 
meant that no more resettlements were necessary.
22 See The Inspection Panel (2009), Accountability at the World Bank. The Inspection Panel at 15 years, http://siteresources. 
worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/380793-1254158345788/InspectionPanel2009.pdf (PDF, 10,1 MB, not barrier-free) [ac-
cessed 10.02.2015], pp. 13, 47 f.; Collabora tive Learning Projects (2011), Feedback Mechanisms in International Assistance Organizations, 
http://www.hapinternational.org/pool/files/cda-report-feedback-mechanisms-in-international-organisations.pdf (PDF, 586 KB) [accessed 
27.08.2013]. 
23 On the question of what donors should focus on in cooperation with governments that do not enjoy broad social legitimacy, see Simon 
Hartmann (2011), Geberverhalten in der internationalen Entwicklungspolitik. Schwierigkeiten beim Umgang mit dem Spannungsfeld Re-
chenschaftspflichten, Working Paper no. 26, Österreichische Forschungsstelle für internationale Entwicklung, http://www.oefse.at/file-
admin/content/Downloads/Publikationen/Workingpaper/WP26_Geberverhalten.pdf (PDF, 288 KB, not barrier-free) [accessed 10.02.2015]
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2.3.4 Benefits at home
CSOs’ demands for donor accountability have become 
a key issue in both donor and partner countries. This 
is under scored by the German CSO umbrella organi-
sation Forum Menschenrechte’s proposal for a human 
rights complaints mechanism for bilateral develop-
ment cooper ation and highlighted in discussions con-
cerning the post-2015 development goals. The issue 
also appears in the complaints about development 
projects made to the Inter-American human rights 
system as well the publication of the Maastricht Prin-
ciples on Extra-territorial Obligations of States. In her 
latest report, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situa-
tion of human rights defenders addressed the impact 
of large-scale development projects on the situation 
of human rights activists and called on donors to 
support or establish effective me chanisms for human 
rights-based accountability or redress.24
A complaints mechanism will also help donors to bet-
ter manage their own risks and reputation. Merely by 
establishing a complaint, a donor demonstrates its will 
to subject its own actions to legal standards. Provided 
the donor’s recommendations are taken seriously and 
their implementation is recognised by CSOs, this may 
facilitate dialogue between the state and CSOs about 
the challenges and continuing dilemmas of develop-
ment cooperation. As well as raising the public debate 
about development cooperation and what it can or 
cannot achieve to a qualitatively higher level, an in-
dependent public complaints mechanism would, via 
the complaints it receives, further clarify and define 
the extent of the donor’s human rights obligations in 
the context of international development cooperation 
as well as the division of roles between donors and 
partner countries.
2.3.5 Closing the accountability gap in 
development cooperation 
A complaints mechanism would serve to complement 
other aspects of accountability in development coop-
eration, which should ideally include effectiveness, 
transparency25 and independent evaluation. The re-
view carried out by a central, independent mechanism 
can be complemented by establishing or strength-
ening a confidential problem-solving process in the 
partner countries themselves, or at least within the 
projects in question. 
Evaluations, even independent ones, are no substitute 
for a complaints mechanism, although both can take 
on a preventive and programme-shaping function. 
The difference is that a complaints mechanism is set 
in motion by the affected party and must respond 
more quickly than an evaluation programme, which 
usually follows consultations in Germany. An evalua-
tion, on the one hand, follows the logic of the devel-
opment project and is aimed at assessing its efficacy 
and whether it has achieved its goals. A complaints 
mechanism, on the other hand, focuses on the issue 
of human rights infringement. Since affected parties 
may in some cases lodge complaints about a project 
that has already been assessed by an evaluation team, 
these two functions should be separated. 
Accountability vis-à-vis German citizens, the German 
parliament and the population in the partner coun-
try can and should be linked via parliamentary con-
trol. The need for development projects to be flexible 
so that they can react to political or social change 
precludes detailed ex ante control of each individual 
programme by the parliament, making comprehensive 
ex post accountability all the more important.26 Part 
24 Forum Menschenrechte (2012), Proposal for a Human Rights Complaint Mechanism for German Development Cooperation, http://www.
forum-menschenrechte.de/cms/upload/PDF/ab_02_2012/1210_FMR_Proposal_HR_Complaint_Procedure_Dev_Coop.pdf (PDF, 55 KB, 
not barrier-free) [accessed 24.10.2013]. OHCHR (2013), Who Will Be Accountable? Human Rights and the Post-2015 Development Agen-
da, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/WhoWillBeAccountable.pdf (PDF, 1,8 MB, not barrier-free) [accessed 27.08.2013]; pe-
tition of the Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights et al. in the Name of the Survivors of the Rio Negro Community 
and other Communities Affected by the Chixoy Damm before the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (2011) http://globalini-
tiative-escr.org/advocacy/guatemala-holding-the-world-bank-accountable-for-human-rights-violations/ [accessed 10.02.2015]; Maas-
tricht Principles on the Extra-Territorial Obligations of States in the Field of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2012) http://www.
etoconsortium.org/nc/en/library/maastricht-principles/?tx_drblob_pi1[downloadUid]=62 [accessed 28.08.2013]; United Nations Special 
Rapporteur for Human Rights De fenders (2013), Situation of Human Rights Defenders, United Nations General Assembly A/68/262, nos. 
70–76, 84, http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/68/262 [accessed 22.11.2013].
25 See the International Aid Transparency Initiative http://www.aidtransparen cy.net/ [accessed 27.08.2013]. 
26 See Hannes Grimm (1992), “Parlamentarische Kontrolldefizite der deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit?” In Die öffentliche Ver-
waltung, January 1992, no. 1, p. 24.
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of the parliamentary ex post accountability process 
should consist of open sessions attended by CSOs and 
representatives of state development cooperation 
institutions. Here the Committee for Economic Co-
operation and the Committee for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Aid would present reports containing 
information from the BMZ and the implementation 
agencies detailing complaints received and how they 
have been addressed.
2.3.6 German development cooperation 
moves forward on human rights 
Establishing complaints mechanisms is part of an 
international trend. They are now obligatory for cli-
mate protection projects, for example. Alongside 
multilateral international and regional development 
banks, some bilateral donors have also established 
such mechanisms.27 At the same time more attention 
is being devoted to integrating human rights into 
monitoring criteria, as in the case of the revision of 
the World Bank safeguards under way since 2012. The 
IFC’s revised Performance Standards also contain ru-
dimentary human rights provisions.28
By envisioning a complaints mechanism based on 
human rights, German development cooperation has 
integrated these trends right from the start. 
3 Accountability for State Activity 
Abroad 
3.1 Extra-territorial obligations in basic 
rights and human rights 
Donors are not responsible for a partner country’s hu-
man rights deficiencies, but they are responsible for 
what happens to the money they donate. From a le-
gal point of view, calls for a human rights complaints 
mechanism may be based on the principle of ex-
tra-territorial responsibility, which states that human 
rights are binding for a state in everything it does – 
whether at home or abroad. If states make payments 
under the auspices of development cooperation and 
advise partner institutions at the local level, they are 
fundamentally bound in their actions to observe ba-
sic and human rights. This so-called extra-territorial 
application of human rights is stipulated by Article 2 
(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and was recently defined 
more concretely by Article 32 of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The German 
Constitutional Court has ruled that German public 
authorities are fundamentally bound to observe ba-
sic rights, and that the same is true when it comes 
to the effects of their activities abroad.29 In addition, 
Article 2 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights obligates states to establish ef-
fective complaints mechanisms for those whose hu-
man rights are at risk. In keeping with the principle of 
extra-territorial responsibility, this should apply not 
only to actions on a state’s own territory but also to 
extra-territorial activities.30 A recent study on inter-
national law also comes to the conclusion that the 
theoretical basis for development cooperation law 
“still dates from a time in the development of state 
theory when the authorities guarded the rights of the 
people, but affected parties were granted no right to 
seek redress from the state”. The principle of the rule 
of law, the study continues, applies both to donor and 
partner countries, however. In its recent concluding 
observations addressed to Austria, the Committee for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights called on the 
Austrian government to take a human rights-based 
approach to development cooperation policy and to 
establish effective complaints mechanisms for cases 
in which economic, social or cultural rights were vio-
lated as a result of development cooperation in target 
27 The Japan International Cooperation Agency, for example, offers an objection procedure. For more details on the mechanisms used by 
bilateral and multilateral institutions see Chapter 5, with further references in note 56. Shortly before going to print, German and inter-
national CSOs stated that the Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG) and its Dutch counterpart the FMO Development Bank intended 
to set up a complaints mechanism. Update 2015: The mechanism is now operational, see https://www.deginvest.de/International-financ-
ing/DEG/Die-DEG/Verantwortung/Beschwerdemanagement/ [accessed 18.1.2015]
28 Safeguards or performance standards are the due diligence measures of the institutions in question.
29 For a comprehensive systematic overview of the rulings of the German Constitutional Court with further documentation, see Dirk Lorenz 
(2005), Der territoriale Anwendungsbereich der Grund- und Menschenrechte: Zugleich ein Beitrag zum Individual schutz in bewaffneten 
Konflikten, Menschenrechtszentrum der Universität Potsdam, vol. 26, 1st ed. (Berlin: BWV), pp. 129 f.
30 See also Andrea Kämpf and Inga Winkler (2012), “Zwischen Menschenrechtsförderung und Duldung von Menschenrechtsverletzungen? 
Anforderungen an die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus der Perspektive der extraterritorialen Staatenpflichten”. In Tessa Debus, Regina 
Kreide, Michael Krennerich, Karsten Malowitz, Arnd Pollmann and Susanne Zwingel (eds), Zeitschrift für Menschenrechte. Menschenre-
chte als Maßstab internationaler Politik, vol. 6, 2012, no. 2 (Schwalbach: Wochenschauverlag), p. 63.
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countries.31 The extent of extra-territori al obligations 
is discussed differently in each of the two covenants. 
Decisions and rulings pertaining to the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights as well as to the European 
Human Rights Convention basically limit responsi-
bility for ext ra-territorial human rights to situations 
where a third-party state exercises sovereign author-
ity over a territory or a person, for example, in cas-
es of military occupation or detentions abroad. Such 
constellations are, however, not relevant to develop-
ment cooperation, since donors are not endowed with 
nor do they exercise territorial or personal sovereign 
authority in partner countries. With respect to the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, 
the discussion proposes a more far-reaching respon-
sibility for a state in proportion to the scope of its 
extra-territorial influence. While the proposals made 
are still vague, the trend is towards a more concrete 
definition of extra-territorial obligations – both in the 
rulings by the European Court of Human Rights and 
in the Maastricht Principles on the Extra-terri torial 
Application of Economic, Social and Cultural Human 
Rights. The conclusion is that states must themselves 
observe human rights even when it comes to their ac-
tions abroad as well as protect them and contribute 
to their fulfilment as far as possible. 
Should a violation of international law or of a human 
rights treaty be identified, and should this violation 
be attributed to a state, the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts can 
be applied. Although these articles do not in them-
selves have a binding legal character, many of their 
provisions are considered international customary 
law. Since donor countries involved in development 
cooperation do not act alone or independently on the 
territory of the partner country, Article 16 of the In-
ternational Law Commission’s Draft Articles, which 
cover aid or assistance in the commission of an in-
ternationally wrongful act, may apply.32 The crucial 
point here is where one should draw the boundaries 
of a donor state’s due diligence obligation: a direct 
and deliberate intention to violate human rights on 
the part of donors active in development cooperation 
will very rarely exist or if it does will not be prova-
ble. Should donors, however, learn of human rights 
infringements or should they be plausibly informed 
that these could occur, they can no longer claim ig-
norance of their existence or to have supported them 
unknowingly. The due diligence obligation binds do-
nors to ensure that their work will not contribute to 
human rights infringements.33 
The legal basis for a human rights complaints 
mechanism in development cooperation 
Article 2 (1) of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural rights (referred to 
henceforth as the ICESCR), Article 4 of the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child and especially 
Article 32 of the UN Convention of the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities serve as a basis for ex-
tra-territorial obligations of states including in the 
field of development cooperation. 
Article 2 (2, 3) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (referred to henceforth as 
the ICCPR) obliges signatories to establish effec-
tive judicial and administrative complaints mech-
anisms.
Articles 14 and 15 of the ICCPR formulate require-
ments for court proceedings, which here can be 
cited for comparative purposes (access, independ-
ence, transpa rency, standards of review).
Article 25 of the ICCPR formulates a right to take 
part in the conduct of public affairs, which includes 
participation in the planning and implementation 
of measures to promote development. 
The ban on discrimination enshrined in all hu-
man rights treaties (including Article 2 (1) of the 
ICCPR and Article 2 (2) of the ICESCR).
31 Jaqueline Neumann (2013), “Donor obligations”, in Development and Cooperation, no. 2, 2013/02, p. 462, http://www.dandc.eu/en/ 
article/donor-agencies-must-not-only-promote-rule-law-they-must-also-be-held-accountable-it [accessed 22.11.2013], with refer-
ence to Jacqueline Neumann (2013), Die Förderung der Rule of Law in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Ein Beitrag zur Herausbildung 
einer völkerrechtlichen Verfassungsnorm (Münster, 2013), Committee on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, 68th session, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/AUT/CO/4, no. 11.
32 International Law Commission (2001), Article 16. http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf (PDF, 
72 KB) [accessed 10.02.2015]. The rules governing the responsibility of states can be applied to human rights treaties. See Carmen 
Thiele (2011), “Das Verhältnis zwischen Staatenverantwortlichkeit und Menschenrechten”. In Archiv des Völkerrechts, vol. 49, no. 4, 
pp. 343–372, here p. 356; Philipp Dann (2012), Entwicklungsverwaltungsrecht: Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechts der Entwicklungszu-
sammenarbeit, untersucht am Beispiel der Weltbank, der EU und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck), p. 285.
33 Dann (2012), Entwicklungsverwaltungsrecht (see note 32), pp. 286–287; Helmut Philipp Aust and George Nolte (2009), “Equivocal Help-
ers – Complicit States, Mixed Messages and International Law”. In International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 58, pp. 1–30, here 
pp. 13 ff.; Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2011), Concluding Observations on Germany’s Fifth Report on Implementa-
tion of the ICESCR (13). UN Dok. E/C.12/DEU/CO/5. The discussion is now guided by the principle of due dili gence also used in the context 
of corporate responsibility. See Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework (Ruggie Principles) (2011), UN Dok. A/HRC/17/31.
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If a partner country misuses donor payments, the 
crucial question is then the extent to which the do-
nor payments can be regarded as support and what 
standards of due diligence can be required with re-
spect to the donor’s actions: in other words, to what 
extent should a donor state be able to predict the 
consequence of its actions and at what point in time? 
In defining these due diligence obligations in more 
concrete terms, it should be borne in mind that a do-
nor’s influence on a partner country’s actions is not 
unlimited. It is also important to stress that due dili-
gence obligations should not be so stringently applied 
that states are discouraged from engaging in interna-
tional cooperation altogether.34 In cases like those in 
Cambodia and Namibia described above, the question 
remains to what extent a donor can excuse its ac-
tions and claim to have been involved only in the “un-
problematic”  – i.e. human-rights conforming  – part 
of a project. In other words, where are the systemic 
boundaries of development cooperation support that 
define donor responsibility? 
The extra-territorial application of human rights 
means that the already familiar notions of the state 
as duty-bearer and the population as rights-holders 
is now extended further to cover the state and the 
population of the partner country. What this means 
for donors is that their accountability vis-à-vis their 
own population now also extends to the population of 
the partner country. To date, accountability arrange-
ments between the donor and the population of a 
partner country have had the weakest footing. Those 
engaged in state-sponsored development cooperation 
usually work together with state agencies in the part-
ner country and – at best – foster their accountability 
vis-à-vis their own population, but see themselves as 
accountable only to their own constituencies in the 
donor country. Thus the mechanisms enabling a part-
ner country’s population to lodge complaints about a 
donor are correspondingly weak. The population usu-
ally does not know what the two governments have 
negotiated or what the government or a subordinate 
authority has agreed with the implementation agency; 
hence the population knows neither whom to lodge a 
complaint with or indeed whether they can lodge a 
complaint at all. Although there have been instances 
when implementing agencies have been sued in the 
partner country, such as in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo in 2010, such cases have generally concerned 
civil law issues such as breach of contract or procure-
ment rather than the project’s human rights impact.35 
In theory, complainants should be entitled to sue Ger-
many before a German court. But how is a Cambodian 
agricultural labourer, for instance, supposed to gain 
access to such a legal mechanism? Moreover, how a 
German court would go about hearing evidence and 
adequately taking into account the special conditions 
of development cooperation has yet to be convincing-
ly demonstrated.36
3.2 Legal basis for a complaints mechanism
Donors like the World Bank have laid down certain 
standards of conduct that cover the nature and ex-
tent of activity in which they are likely to be engaged. 
With the exception of the environmental and social 
compatibility guidelines established by the KfW, such 
standards of conduct do not yet exist for German im-
plementation agencies. The political and human rights 
concepts or the guidelines of the BMZ37 are nowhere 
near as specific as the safeguards und performance 
standards of the World Bank and the IFC. It would 
34 See also Aust and Nolte (2009), “Equivocal Helpers”, see note 33.
35 See Frank Räther (2010), “Minister Niebel hat ein Problem am Kongo”. In Sächsische Zeitung, no. 17. September 2010. http://www.sz-on-
line.de/nachrichten/minister-niebel-hat-ein-problem-am-kongo-265544.html [accessed 28.08.2013].
36 The same no doubt applies to lodging a complaint through the Petitions Committee of the German Bundestag. The right to petition is 
granted not only to Germans or to those resident in Germany but to anyone. It is therefore in principle also open to complainants from 
developing countries. However, access to the website where petitions can be submitted electronically is only accessible in German. See 
Deutscher Bundestag: Petitionen. Startseite, https://epetitionen.bundestag.de/ [accessed 29.11.2013]. The Bundestag’s English-language 
website on the Petitions Committee merely outlines the legal basis for petitioning and otherwise refers to the German website, but it 
does at least give a postal address. See German Bundestag: Petitions Committee, http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/com-
mittees/a02/index.jsp [accessed 29.11.2013]. 
37 BMZ (2013), Neuer Leitfaden. Hans-Jürgen Beerfeltz, “Menschenrechte bei Entwicklungsprojekten besser schützen”, press release of the 
BMZ dated 14 Feb. 2013, http://www.bmz.de/de/presse/aktuelleMeldungen/archiv/2013/februar/20130214_pm_25_menschenrechte/ 
index.html [accessed 10.02.2015]. The guidelines on the BMZ’s website can be found neither via a web search nor via the search function 
on the website itself. They have, however, been widely distributed in both German and English to German CSOs. For the German version 
see BMZ (2013), Leitfaden zur Berücksichti gung von menschenrechtlichen Standards und Prinzipien, einschl. Gender, bei der Erstellung 
von Programmvorschlägen der deutschen staatlichen Technischen und Finanziellen Zusammenarbeit, www.wikindigena.org/images/
temp/4/43/20130513084414!phpIoGobO.pdf (PDF, 233 KB) [ accessed 22.11.2013]. Update 2015: The guidelines are now accessible in 
German on the website of BMZ, http://www.bmz.de/de/zentrales_downloadarchiv/menschenrechte/Leitfaden_PV_2013_de.pdf (PDF, 
346 KB), and also in English on the website of GIZ, http://www.giz.de/expertise/downloads/Guidelines_on_incorporating_human_rights_
standards_and_principles.pdf. (PDF, 274 KB) [accessed 18.1.2015].
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therefore be helpful to introduce such standards of 
conduct before preparing country concepts or pro-
gramme proposals, since these would provide guid-
ance for development cooperation staff and would fa-
cilitate the prevention of human rights infringements. 
Therefore German development cooperation organi-
sations should, at least with a view to the future, draft 
their own standards of conduct and these should be 
founded on human rights from the very start.38
But even without such standards of conduct the BMZ 
as a donor must have the complaints it receives ex-
amined independently and assume responsibility for 
them. Until German development cooperation has es-
tablished its own standards of due diligence, a com-
plaints mechanism could be founded on the provi-
sions of human rights treaties and the BMZ’s existing 
“Guidelines on Incorporating Human Rights Standards 
and Principles, including Gender, in Programme Pro-
posals for Bilateral German Technical and Financial 
Cooperation” as well as established international due 
diligence standards. The BMZ could then systematise 
these treaties and guidelines for its own use. Rules of 
procedure aimed at avoiding abuse would establish 
a framework to determine which complaints would 
be admissible. The experience gained in this process 
could then serve as a basis for German development 
cooperation to prepare its own standards of conduct. 
Whereas these would not be able to cover all possible 
circumstances, they would need to take into account 
the kinds of cases that are typically at risk of produc-
ing human rights infringements.39
4 Challenges
The experiences resulting from the development 
banks’ existing mechanisms highlight three main 
challenges: agreeing to an independent and public 
complaints mechanism with the partner country and 
securing the ensuing visiting and inspection rights; 
ensuring that affected parties have unendangered ac-
cess to such a mechanism; and integrating the mech-
anism in the processes and procedures of the donor 
organisation.40
4.1 Acceptance by the partner country 
If partner countries reject the inspection powers in-
cluded as part of a complaints mechanism, they need 
to be motivated to pay more attention to accounta-
bility. This implies that if accountability requirements 
increase, it may be more difficult for donors to nego-
tiate development cooperation agreements with part-
ner countries and, in extreme cases, may even result 
in the discontinuation of cooperation in a specific 
sector. Donors’ negotiating position may be weakened 
if the donor coordination required by the Paris Dec-
laration of the Organisation for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) fails to materialise and 
other donors are content with less stringent human 
rights standards. Some use this “China argument” to 
reject any discussion at all about human rights in for-
eign policy.41 German development cooperation policy 
38 See Human Rights Watch (2013), Abuse-Free Development. How the World Bank Should Safeguard Against Human Rights Viola tions, 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/worldbank0713_ForUpload.pdf (PDF, 628 KB, not barrier-free) [accessed 26.08.2013]; Am-
nesty International (2013), Submission to the World Bank Safeguards Policies Review and Update April 2013, http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/info/IOR80/002/2013/en [accessed 28.08.2013]; Galit A. Sarfaty (2012), Values in Translation, Human Rights and the Culture of the 
World Bank, 1st ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
39 The World Bank’s safeguards policies and the IFC’s performance standards have been particularly criticised by CSOs because they do not 
reflect all human rights, or at least not in any systematic fashion. CSOs also objected to the drafting of standards of conduct for bilateral 
German development cooperation on the grounds that safeguards or performance standards can never cover all possible cases. While this 
is true, it should not constitute an obstacle to concrete standards of conduct, which apply to cases with a typically high risk for human 
rights. Other cases or aspects not covered by such standards can still be judged according to the provisions of human rights treaties. 
40 Independent Evaluation Group (2010), Safeguards and Sustainability Policies in a Changing World. An Independent Evaluation of World 
Bank Group Experience. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSAFANDSUS/Resources/Safeguards_eval.pdf (PDF, 5,3 MB, not barrier-free) 
[accessed 27.08.2013]. 
41 See Eberhard Sandschneider (2013), “Raus aus der Moralecke! Die deutsche Außenpolitik sollte der Welt nicht ihre Werte diktieren”. In 
Zeit Online, 10 March 2013, http://www.zeit.de/2013/10/Aussenpolitik-Diskussion-Moral [accessed 27.08.2013]; Volkmar Deile (2013), 
“Lasst die diplomatischen Floskeln! Menschenrechte einzufordern ist kein Wahn von Gutmenschen, sondern liegt im Interesse aller Poli-
tik”. In Zeit Online, 30 April 2013. http://www.zeit.de/2013/18/diplomatie-floskeln-menschenrechte [accessed 24.10.2013]. 
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should not seek to engage in such a “race to the bot-
tom”, nor indeed can it, given its own already existing 
human rights standards.42 Instead, it should have the 
courage to adhere to its own standards in a coordi-
nated and consistent manner. Using human rights 
considerations as a concrete standard is a plus and 
should be communicated as such, for there is hardly 
a country in the world that would like to be perceived 
as a violator of human rights.
Development cooperation professionals often argue 
that an independent public complaints mechanism is 
perceived as an additional form of control, burden-
ing the relationship of trust between them and their 
contacts in the institutions of partner countries due 
to the sensitivities of the latter. This is certainly one 
of several realistic scenarios, but it is just as plausible 
that partner countries will deliberately seek German 
support if they want to demonstrate their will to ob-
serve human rights. 
As a rule a relationship of trust is based on reciproci-
ty. A donor engaged in human rights-oriented devel-
opment cooperation should therefore also define the 
human rights parameters within which it is prepared 
to work. This does not, however, exclude development 
cooperation in sectors or countries that pose a risk for 
human rights; those involved must simply plan a lot of 
time to bring about necessary change. In such cases, 
a comprehensive prior evaluation of the human rights 
consequences as well as close monitoring during im-
plementation are essential. 
If development cooperation professionals are to con-
vincingly communicate the merits not only of a com-
plaints mechanism but also of human rights standards 
as a basis for shaping policy, some thought needs to 
be given to the requirements they must meet. If they 
are to bring about change in the human rights situa-
tion via dialogue, development professionals need not 
only technical know-how, an ability to communicate 
and poli tical skills, but also human rights competence. 
An independent, transparent complaints mechanism 
accords with the central principle of a partner country 
assuming responsibility for its economic and political 
decisions. This principle, which is recognised by devel-
opment policy-makers, is described as “ownership” in 
the key Paris Declaration of 2005. Since partner coun-
tries have regularly ratified important human rights 
treaties, they are themselves obliged to put them 
into practice.43 If in such cases donors remind partner 
countries of their obligation to respect human rights, 
this is not tantamount to heteronomy. A complaints 
mechanism of the donor does not constitute inter-
ference in the internal affairs of the partner coun-
try, since it extends only to the sphere of the donor’s 
responsibility.44 The more concrete Accra Agenda for 
Action following the OECD’s Paris Declaration also 
makes clear, that “ownership” requires not only gov-
ernment approval but also the involvement of parlia-
ment and civil society.
Partner countries can be persuaded to become more 
accountable, as is illustrated by German development 
cooperation projects such as the introduction of a 
functioning public redress system in the local author-
ities in Sri Lanka and the establishment of complaints 
channels for patients in Cambodia’s state healthcare 
system or for water consumers vis-à-vis water pro-
viders in Kenya.45 
4.2 Access for affected parties
A complaint made by an inhabitant of rural Cambo-
dia, say, first of all needs to actually reach a com-
plaints mechanism in Germany. For this to happen, 
the person in question needs to have easy access to 
two pieces of information: Is German development 
cooperation involved in this case, and if so, how and 
where can I lodge a complaint? To date, both of these 
pieces of information have been difficult to obtain for 
people in partner countries. The first port of call for 
such information is usually the local German embas-
42 On the German government’s own human rights standards see the coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU and FDP (2009), Wach-
stum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt. https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Ministerium/koalitionsvertrag.pdf?__blob=publi-
cationFile (PDF, 722 KB, not barrier-free) [accessed 10.02.2015], the human rights concept of the BMZ, BMZ (2011), Human Rights 
in German Development Policy. BMZ Strategy Paper, p. 12. http://www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/strategies/Strat-
egiepapier305_04_2011.pdf (PDF, 484 KB) [accessed 28.08.2013] and the draft coalition agreement for the 18th legislative term: 
Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten. Koalitionsver trag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD. 18. Legislaturperiode, pp.179 f. http://news.spd.de/
go/97az7owb/etk6kzet/49 [accessed 29.11.2013].
43 See also no. 13 c) Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2008), The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 
Accra Agenda for Action, http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf (PDF, 317 KB, not barrier-free) [accessed 10.02.2015].
44 It is becoming increasingly evident in the international law discourse that the sovereignty argument that states use to block outside 
intervention in human-rights issues is becoming ever more porous.
45 See GIZ (2012), Human Rights in German Development Cooperation. Examples from the field. Regional Examples: Sri Lanka, p.7; Cam-
bodia, p.19; Kenya, p.23. http://www.giz.de/expertise/downloads/Fachexpertise/giz2012-en-hr-in-german-development-cooperation.pdf 
(PDF, 3,9 MB, not barrier-free) [accessed 6.2.2015]
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sy and its website, but often the website contains no 
information about development cooperation or about 
specific programmes. Complainants require informa-
tion in the local language, and it must be possible to 
lodge a complaint via an intermediary CSO.
More information about German development coop-
eration programmes can be found on the websites of 
the BMZ, the GIZ and the KfW. Although this informa-
tion can be found via a Google search, this assumes 
detailed knowledge of the German development co-
operation landscape as well as a knowledge of Ger-
man or English. In practice it is practically impossible 
for an outsider to ascertain where a complaint can 
ultimately be lodged.46 This means that the possibility 
of lodging a complaint needs to be adequately publi-
cised – including by the implementing agency. In ad-
dition to the embassy, a local GIZ or KfW office may 
therefore be a first point of contact. 
Germany is a signatory to the Internati onal Aid 
Transparency Initiative (IATI). This is an international 
standard that sets parameters for making information 
about development cooperation projects available, 
but so far implementation has been very slow.47 This 
is particularly surprising in view of the fact that de-
velopment policy research has concluded that trans-
parent donors spend their money in a much more 
targeted fashion that meets the needs of those for 
whom it is intended and in a way that is better adapt-
ed to their institution’s abilities.48 Even information 
that meets the IATI standard may, however, still not be 
sufficient for someone wishing to lodge a complaint, 
since how the information is presented still assumes 
a certain minimum of practice and prior knowledge in 
dealing with information and statistics pertaining to 
development policy. 
Furthermore, the requirements for formulating a com-
plaint must be such that they are readily understanda-
ble for complainants and provide the body responsible 
for making decisions about complaints with an over-
view of the most important points. For a complaint to 
be credible the Inspection Panel of the World Bank, for 
instance, does not require a complainant to specifi-
cally cite particular stipulations of the organisation’s 
internal standards of conduct; rather it is sufficient to 
describe the alleged violation and the damage suffered. 
A complainant must also be able to lodge a complaint 
without fear of repression. In certain cases, this may 
mean that complaints must be communicated via 
representatives in order to avoid revealing the com-
plainant’s identity to the authorities in their country. 
Therefore complainants should be able to task indi-
viduals or organisations such as local or international 
CSOs with presenting their case. 
4.3 Integrating the complaints mechanism 
into the project cycle
The causes of human rights infringements may ex-
tend beyond individual cases to highlight systemic 
deficiencies in the donor’s procedures or between the 
donor and the partner country. Ideally donors should 
be “learning organisations” which treat the outcome 
of a complaints mechanism as an occasion to take a 
critical look at their own procedures. The World Bank 
Inspection Panel regularly identifies such systemic    
aspects.49 In the opinion of the Inspection Panel, it is 
the organisa tional culture of the World Bank, in par-
ticular the so-called “approval cul ture”,50 that can re-
sult in a situation where project risks are not properly 
evaluated: such an “approval culture” instead tends to 
46 See also Chapter 5. The procedures of the implementation agencies could not be found via an Internet search. (2013)
47 See the blog by Claudia Schwegmann, “Open Aid. Transparenz, Rechenschaft und Partizipation in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit: 
BMZ IATI Umsetzungsplan veröffentlicht!” [Internet] Deutschland. 14 January 2013 [cited on 26.08.2013]. http://www.openaid.de/de/
blog/2013/01/14/bmz-iati-umsetzungsplan-veröffentlicht [Stand 24.10.2013]. On the use of blogs see note 8.
48 See Jörg Faust, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (2011), Donor transparency and aid allocation. Discussion Paper. http://www.
die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/%28ynDK_contentByKey%29/ANES-8NUE5M/$FILE/DP%2012.2011.pdf (PDF, 397 KB, not 
barrier-free [accessed 24.10.2013]. 
49 See The Inspection Panel (2009), Accountability at the World Bank. The Inspection Panel at 15 Years, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/380793-1254158345788/InspectionPanel2009.pdf (PDF, 10,1 MB, not barrier-free) [accessed 10.02.2015]. 
International judicial bodies can rule not only on individual cases but can also make recommendations for structural improvements. See 
ECHR, Rules of Procedure, Article 61, Pilot-judgement procedure. http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Pilot_judgments_ENG.pdf (PDF, 
341 KB) [accessed 10.02.2015]. 
50 The term “approval culture” was coined in the World Bank’s Wapenhans Report in 1992. The internal report, which was later leaked, 
sharply attacked the procedures used by the World Bank, holding its bureaucratic culture responsible for bad decisions on the granting 
of loans. It claimed that World Bank staff did not use the possible positive or negative consequences of a project as a basis for deciding 
to grant loans but instead whatever the bank regarded as successful and hence likely to promote a person’s career: namely, awarding 
loans as quickly as possible. The World Bank established its Inspection Panel in 1993. On this see Mac Darrow (2003), Between Light and 
Shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and International Human Rights Law (Oxford, 2003), pp. 197 f.
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reward spending money quickly and completely with-
out properly assessing the possible negative effects.51 
An analogous situation in German development coop-
eration would be, for example, if water affordability 
were consigned to the background because recouping 
costs was accorded top priority in reforms of the water 
sector.52
If the outcome of a complaints mechanism is taken 
into account in the procedures shaping development 
projects, then it may prove to have a preventive ef-
fect. A study has shown, however, that the results 
of complaints mechanisms are rarely fed back into 
programme conception and local implementation 
processes in a structured or systematic fashion.53 De-
velopment banks’ experience with such mechanisms 
shows that support for the mechanism by the director 
of the organisation in question can play a crucial role. 
5 The Complaints Mechanism – 
Internal Problem-Solving and External 
Review 
The suggestions made in this policy paper are based 
on the experience of international human rights trea-
ty bodies and development banks in dealing with 
complaints. In setting up its Inspection Panel in 1993, 
the World Bank played a pioneering role in the es-
tablishment of a series of mechanisms in other banks 
such as the Inter-American Development Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank. The mechanisms put in 
place were in each case based on the previous ex-
perience of another bank and hence sought to refine 
and improve preceding mechanisms. In installing 
these mechanisms, the banks were both responding 
to strong pressure from CSOs and recognising them-
selves that they needed to ensure compliance with 
their internal standards.54
The procedures of the human rights treaty bodies in 
particular can provide important pointers to how to 
organise rules of procedure. They do not, however, pro-
vide a suitable channel for accountability in develop-
ment cooperation, since many states do not recognise 
procedures such as the individual complaints procedure 
provided for by international human rights treaties. 
What is more, such procedures take too long for the 
architects of development cooperation programmes 
to respond adequately. Last but least, human rights 
treaty bodies are international bodies and as such not 
specialised in questions pertaining to the development 
cooperation programmes of individual countries.
A mechanism of this kind may represent a starting 
point for involving development cooperation projects 
of other ministries as well as other spheres of foreign 
policy activity. 
5.1 Background: evolution and 
classification of development bank 
complaints mechanisms 
There are basically two kinds of procedures: the first, 
described here as a problem-solving procedure with 
mediation-like character (an example would be the 
Consultation Mechanism provided for by the Asian 
Development Bank, ADB); the second is a compliance 
review in which measures are examined for compli-
ance with internal standards (for example, the In-
spection Panel of the World Bank or the Compliance 
Review Process at the ADB). 
The characteristics of each kind of mechanism allow 
us to draw some rough distinctions. The “first gen-
eration” of mechanisms  – those introduced by the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB) as well as the predecessor of the current 
mechanism at the ADB – are designed solely to exam-
ine compliance with internal standards without prior 
use of the problem-solving mechanism. A “second 
generation” are the ombudsman functions of the In-
ternational Finance Corporation and the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency, which combine prob-
lem-solving and compliance review in a single func-
tion. The “third generation”, introduced by the Afri-
can, Inter-American and Asian development banks as 
well as the European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
51 See The Inspection Panel (2009), p. 64. See note 49.
52 Munguti Katui Katua, Ashfaq Khalfan, Malcolm Langford, Monika Lüke (2007), Kenyan-German Development Cooperation in the Water 
Sector. Assessment from a Human Rights Perspective (Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit). http://www.
institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/uploads/tx_commerce/mission_report_kenyan-german_dc_in_water_sector.pdf (PDF, 394 KB, not bar-
rier-free) [accessed 24.10.2013], pp. 35 ff.
53 Collaborative Learning Projects (2011), Feedback Mechanisms in International Assistance Organizations, http://www.hapinternational.
org/pool/files/cda-report-feedback-mechanisms-in-international-organisations.pdf (PDF, 586 KB) [accessed 27.08.2013].
54 See Maartje Van Putten (2008), Policing the Banks. Accountability Mechanisms for the Financial Sector (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Uni-
versity Press), pp. 63 f.
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velopment include both a problem-solving procedure 
and a compliance review, but these are procedurally 
and institutionally separate. This development reflects 
the experience that problem-solving mechanisms are 
regularly only used seriously by parties if it is clear to 
both sides – in particular to the stronger of the two – 
that an independent compliance review will follow 
if they fail to agree. Consequently the two mecha-
nisms – problem-solving and compliance – should be 
institutionally, procedurally, financially and politically 
separate and also independent of the respective oper-
ative departments.
The banks’ mechanisms only check whether they have 
followed their own standards of conduct and are 
hence not a substitute for the jurisdiction of the part-
ner countries nor do they interfere with these. 
The United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, 
recently established a two-stage complaints mecha-
nism required by its participation in programmes such 
as the climate protection instrument REDD+ (Reduc-
ing Emissions from Deforestation and Degrada tion).55 
Alongside the multilateral development banks, bi-
lateral donors have also established procedures for 
dealing with complaints, in particularly for the field 
of foreign trade promotion, but also for technical and 
financial development cooperation.56 
None of the mechanisms presented here was original-
ly designed to focus solely on human rights, but this 
is gradually changing, as demonstrated, for example, 
by the revised Performance Standards of the World 
Bank’s International Finance Corporation, and it is in-
creasingly being discussed as the World Bank reviews 
its Safeguard Policies. 
5.2 A confidential internal procedure and 
an independent public procedure 
The standard today is a two-part mechanism – con-
sisting first of a problem-solving procedure that takes 
place at the project location and second, of a central, 
independent compliance review.57 While the first has 
a mediative character and is generally confidential, 
the second is an independent process whose stages 
are documented in a transparent manner. The first 
gives organisations an opportunity in dialogue with 
the participants to find a solution quickly and in good 
faith. The independent public compliance review be-
comes relevant if the participants have been unable 
to reach an agreement or if no remedy can be found, 
because the infringement is already irreversible.
German implementation agencies say they have inter-
nal procedures for dealing with complaints: the KfW, 
for example, has a standard complaints procedure 
that it follows with respect to complaints received, 
including those concerning human rights issues. Com-
plaints are usually dealt with within the KfW by the 
Department responsible for the project in question in 
consultation with the General Policy Department and 
where necessary with the Compliance Department 
and/or Internal Review. The GIZ set up a complaints 
procedure in the summer of 2012 with its own special 
email address.58 The person responsible for dealing 
with complaints is the Integrity Advisor of the GIZ, 
who  – where necessary  – ensures that complaints 
are handled confidentially and coordinates the han-
dling of the complaint via an established procedure 
that involves the complaints as well as the region-
al and general policy departments. Confidentiality is 
ensured not only at the beginning of the procedure 
55 UNDP has also consulted its compliance mechanism publically. See International Institute for Sustainable Develop ment (2012), UNDP 
launches Consultation on Compliance and Grievance Review Process, http://uncsd.iisd.org/news/undp-launches-consultation-on-com-
pliance-and-grievance-review-process/ [accessed 28.08.2013]. See also the website of UNDP’s mechanism: Social and Environmen-
tal Compliance Review and Stakeholder Response Mechanism, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/accountability/
secu-srm/ [accessed 6.2.2015]
56 The Japan International Cooperation Agency has a so-called “objection procedure” for technical and financial cooperation. See JICA, En-
vironmental and Social Considerations, http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/social_environmental/guideline/ [accessed 10.02.2015]; 
for a broad overview of the procedures used by both multilateral and bilateral donors see Natalie Bridgeman Fields / Accountability 
Counsel (2012), Accountability Resource Guide. Tools for Redressing Human Rights & Environmental Violations by International Finan-
cial Institutions, Export Promotion Agencies, & Private Corporate Actors, http://www.accountabilitycounsel.org/resources/arg/ [accessed 
22.11.2013]. Shortly before going to press German and international CSOs stated that the Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG) and 
its Dutch counterpart the FMO Development Bank were planning to establish a complaints mechanism. Update 2015: The mechanism 
is now operational, see https://www.deginvest.de/International-financing/DEG/Die-DEG/Verantwortung/Beschwerdemanagement/ [ac-
cessed 18.1.2015]
57 See the previous section.
58 humanrights@giz.de 
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but – if necessary or desired – throughout.59 Besides 
the confidential treatment of individual complaints, 
no information is available to the public either about 
the existence of the complaints procedure or about 
the kind or number of complaints received. Neither 
the procedures of the KfW nor those of the GIZ can be 
found via a regular Internet search.60 
Internal confidential procedures, ideally carried out 
in the place where a development project is actually 
taking place, should indeed be expanded into prob-
lem-solving procedures. The advantage of establish-
ing such procedures locally is that they are more ac-
cessible to affected parties and in some cases may 
also permit the situation to be remedied quickly. 
Nevertheless, they can still be confidential if desired, 
but they should not be abused in order to dispose of 
evidence or to delay programme adjustments. 
The existing procedures of the GIZ and KfW should 
therefore be refined to form the first step in the two-
step mechanism described above. In doing so they 
should be guided by international standards of good 
practice in this field and by the human rights obliga-
tions of Germany and its partner countries. A second 
procedural step should, however, be established inde-
pendently of the implementing agencies. A report of 
the World Bank on the problem-solving mechanisms 
established in the context of development projects 
shows that these are often not carried out satisfacto-
rily – if indeed at all.61 If, however, a central independ-
ent mechanism were to exist alongside existing mech-
anisms, this would secure a complaints channel for 
affected parties. Publically documented procedures 
are generally more suitable as learning experiences 
and can hence have a preventive effect in the future. 
Last but not least, the staff of implementation agen-
cies like the GIZ or the KfW not only bear responsibil-
ity for supporting and advising development projects 
in partner countries but often also monitor the effec-
tiveness of this support as well as draft applications to 
the BMZ for the extension of existing programmes or 
the launching of new ones. This could lead to conflicts 
of interest, whereby complaints are dealt with in a 
way that serves the interests of the institution in order 
not to endanger the continuation of programmes. 
For this reason, a central, independent public compli-
ance review should be created alongside the internal 
problem-solving procedure. The proposal outlined by 
the German Institute for Human Rights in this publi-
cation addresses this central, independent compliance 
review.
5.3 Proposal for a central, independent 
public compliance review 
5.3.1 How to structure the review
The review should follow principles derived from ex-
isting international human rights treaties. 
A fair and objective review will seek to give both the 
complainant and representatives of German develop-
ment cooperation an equal voice and an equal hearing. 
The review must be transparent. German CSOs and, 
where possible, CSOs in the partner countries should 
be involved in its conception. Clear rules should be es-
tablished for determining the admissibility of and the 
grounds for the complaint. These should be published 
at the same time as the status of a specific complaint. 
In order to facilitate access to the review even in rural 
areas, information should be available in all the lan-
guages of the country in question as well as the local 
languages where relevant. 
The review should be adapted to the needs of the 
complainant, who should be able to lodge complaints 
without fear of repressions. Complaints should be 
able to be lodged not only by the affected parties 
themselves but also by national and international 
CSOs acting on their behalf. Proof that such organisa-
tions have been asked to act on behalf of a party can 
be furnished in a number of different ways. 
As well as potentially affected parties, project agen-
cies in partner countries should be adequately in-
formed about problem-solving procedures and com-
pliance reviews and be obliged to further disseminate 
these. The structure of the review must be easily un-
derstandable and encourage trust in the process. Per-
sonnel involved in the compliance review should act 
59 The information on the GIZ und KfW mechanisms was provided by the GIZ/Stabsstelle Unternehmensentwick lung und KfW/Kompeten-
zcenter Entwicklung und Wissenschaftskooperation in an email exchange in November 2013.
60 A Google search for the keywords “complaint” and “GIZ” turned up GIZ publications on complaints mechanisms in partner countries but 
no reference to the organisation’s internal mechanism. The same applies to an Internet search for “KfW” und “com plaint”. The website 
of the GIZ’s integrity advisor lacks any indication of how complaints about human rights infringements may be lodged, see GIZ, Integ-
ritätsberater, http://www.giz.de/de/ueber_die_giz/1790.html [Internet, no date] [accessed on 6.2.2015]. 
61 World Bank (2013), Global Review of Grievance Redress Mechanisms in World Bank Projects, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PRO-
JECTS/Resources/40940-1366729852427/GlobalReviewofGRMs.pdf (PDF, 1,5 MB, not barrier-free) [accessed 10.02.2015], p. 14
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without undue outside influence and make their in-
dependent status externally visible. The review should 
follow in a timely fashion and address the actual con-
cerns of the complainants.
The review should also take account of the condi-
tions of bilateral German development cooperation 
with respect to structure, legal basis and framework 
for action, and relevant policies. It should also refer 
to complementary mechanisms such as the internal 
complaints management structures of the imple-
menting organisations and the project reviews and 
evaluations. 
5.3.2 Where to set it up 
There are various options for the location of the com-
pliance review: either – as in the case of the banks – it 
could be located within the BMZ itself or in one of the 
German development cooperation institutions such as 
the German Development Institute or the German In-
stitute for Development Evaluation or else external-
ly in an independent institution such as the German 
Institute for Human Rights (GIHR). Whichever loca-
tion is chosen, independence must be guaranteed, as 
must the reporting back of recommendations to the 
BMZ and to the implementing agencies. The experi-
ences of other donors have shown that the political 
will of the director of an institution is what decides 
whether or not recommendations are translated into 
practice.62 Other factors determining the success of 
such a review are whether the institution is able to 
portray itself and be perceived as independent. The 
German national contact point of the Organisation 
for Development and Cooperation in Europe (OECD), 
for example, located in the Federal Ministry for Eco-
nomic Affairs and Energy, is regarded as too strongly 
dominated by the ministry.63 
The response of the Board of Trustees of the GIHR in 
June 2013 to an enquiry by the human rights depart-
ment of the BMZ about locating a compliance review 
at GIHR met with a positive response in principle, al-
though a number of provisos were stipulated.
5.3.3 How to organise the panel of experts 
and secretariat
The compliance review would consist of a secretariat 
and a panel of independent experts. 
The central point of contact would be a secretariat 
staffed by two to three employees, including staff 
with expertise in human rights. With the participa-
tion of all state and civil society stakeholders it would 
draft procedures for selecting the members of the 
panel, including selection criteria, length of mandate 
and the possibility of re-election. The three members 
of the panel would then be elected according to the 
selection procedure and with the participation of the 
stakeholders. The panel would meet after the estab-
lishment of the secretariat. The members of the pan-
el – up to three – could initially be employed flexibly 
depending on the number of cases to be dealt with. 
The banks’ experience highlights the advantages of a 
“standing panel” employed on a regular basis for a 
limited period of time. This would facilitate finding 
experts to staff the panel, since members of the panel 
should not be engaged in German bilateral develop-
ment cooperation projects while they are on the panel 
and for a set period thereafter. A compromise solution 
might be to appoint the head of the panel as a regular 
employee for a limited period of time. Another argu-
ment for a regular, but temporally limited, employ-
ment of panel members is that they otherwise might 
try to encourage affected parties to lodge complaints 
in order to increase their own volume of work. Ideally 
the panel should be staffed with people with a range 
of academic backgrounds and practical experience. 
The panel should have the power to call in people 
with more specific expertise on a case-by-case basis.
The secretariat would be responsible for providing 
comprehensive organisational and substantial sup-
port to the panel. Besides operating the mechanism 
described above, its tasks would include the ongo-
ing development of legal evaluation principles; the 
processing of complaints received from a legal and 
practical point of view to provide the members of the 
panel with the information needed to make decisions; 
62 See note 22.
63 See European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (2011), A Comparison of National Contact Points – Best Practices in OECD 
Complaints Procedures, http://www.ecchr.de/ecchr-publikationen/articles/a-comparison-of-national-contact-points-best- practices-in- 
oecd-complaints-procedures-1327.html?file=tl_files/Dokumente/Publikationen/OECD%2C%20A%20comparison%20of%20
NCPs%2C%20Policy%20Paper%2C%202011-11.pdf (PDF, 353 KB) [accessed 24.10.2013]; OECD Watch describes the Dutch National 
contact point as exemplary; though independent it receives advice from government officials. See OECD Watch (2007), Model National 
Contact Point, http://oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication_2223/at_download/fullfile [accessed 4.11.2013], pp. 8 f. On the ques-
tion of separating the evaluation from the complaints mechanism see Chapter 2.3.5.
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designing and maintaining the website; compiling in-
formation on the compliance review for various target 
groups (development cooperation professionals and 
affected parties); organising visits for panel members 
to the countries concerned for the purpose of compli-
ance review; and where necessary the selection and 
recruitment of further expertise.
5.3.4 What the panel may do - 
competences
The main competence of the panel would be to issue 
recommendations about the admissibility of a com-
plaint and the implementation of interim measures in 
order to prevent permanent damage being done. This 
would include measures to protect the complainants 
from intimidation and persecution. In addition the 
panel would examine how well founded a complaint 
is based on a review of the facts of the case using the 
existing specifications of the BMZ and other stand-
ards, particularly those of the human rights treaties 
that are binding for Germany. The panel and the sec-
retariat would for this purpose require access to in-
formation from the BMZ and the implementing agen-
cies relevant for making a decision, which they would 
treat confidentially. The current status of proceedings 
should be publically posted, and the outcome report 
should be published.
The panel’s recommendations would be presented to 
top-level officials of the BMZ, which would then take 
a decision concerning their implementation. Both the 
recommendations and the decision on implementa-
tion would be published in the languages relevant for 
the complainants. 
In addition, the panel would be able to track the im-
plementation of the decisions and report publically on 
this, reinstitute the procedure at the request of the 
complainants and make systemic or general sugges-
tions for how human rights might be better taken into 
account in German development cooperation. The 
panel and the secretariat would have access to rele-
vant documents, including those of the implementing 
agencies. 
6 Recommendations
The German Institute for Human Rights therefore 
makes the following recommendations 
To the German Federal Ministry for Economic Coop-
eration and Development:
1 To establish by the middle of the eighteenth leg-
islative period a human rights complaints mech-
anism with a central, independent compliance re-
view that meets the requirements for accessibility, 
independence, objectivity and transparency. 
Since Germany adopted its first plan of action on 
human rights in development policy in 2004, it has 
continually expanded its explicit human-rights ori-
entation in development cooperation, for which it 
has received international recognition.64 This human 
rights-based approach has been successively imple-
mented in some of Germany’s partner countries since 
2005 and human rights has been an important stand-
ard of the BMZ and the implementing agencies since 
2012. A human-rights complaints mechanism with a 
central and independent compliance review thus rep-
resents a development consistent with this course. It 
completes an accountability framework of develop-
ment cooperation embracing effectiveness, transpar-
ency and evaluation. 
This mechanism is independent both in its opera-
tion and in the way it arrives at decisions. Its results 
should flow into the conception of both new and ex-
isting programmes as well as into the development 
of instruments and into internal procedures. The 
evaluation criteria and rules of procedure should be 
produced in collaboration with CSOs, the BMZ and 
the implementation agencies in a process visible to 
the public, and its procedures should be organised in 
such as way as to allow complainants as full access 
64 On the German government’s own human-rights standards see note 42. In a study of the OECD and the World Bank on safeguarding 
human rights in development cooperation, German development cooperation is cited as a positive example in its approach to the human 
rights issue. See OECD/World Bank (2013), Integrating Human Rights into Development: Donor Approaches, Experiences and Challenges, 
p. 167, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/12800/9780821396216.pdf (PDF, 2,6 MB, not barrier-free) [ac-
cessed 22.11.2013]; in a publication of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights the editors describe the embedding of the MRA in German development cooperation in positive terms: “In many respects Germany 
has taken the lead in embedding human rights standards into its external development policies”, see OHCHR/CESR (2013): Who Will Be 
Accountable? Human Rights and the Post-2015 Development Agenda, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/WhoWillBeAccountable.
pdf (PDF, 1,8 MB, not barrier-free) [accessed 22.11.2013], pp. 48–49
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as possible. In the future, the ministry together with 
the implementation agencies should produce its own 
human rights-based due diligence standards in dia-
logue with CSOs. 
Human rights require development cooperation to 
have a complaints mechanism. Various complaints 
about development projects in partner countries with 
German involvement have found their way into the 
German public sphere or come to the attention of in-
ternational human rights treaty bodies. It can be as-
sumed that the actual need for such a mechanism is 
much greater in practice. The goal of a human rights 
complaints mechanism with a central, independent 
compliance review is above all to institutionalise a 
feedback mechanism for the populations of partner 
countries with whose governments and state insti-
tutions German development cooperation agrees on 
and implements development measures. If complaints 
from the population about infringements of human 
rights are lodged – complaints which in some cases 
could not have been predicted at the time the agree-
ment with the partner country was concluded – Ger-
many will be able to make timely adjustments in its 
development cooperation projects in order to better 
adapt them to conditions in the partner country.
The legal basis for a complaints mechanism in devel-
opment cooperation is provided by international hu-
man rights treaties, in particular the obligation to es-
tablish effective complaints mechanisms stipulated by 
Article 2 (2, 3) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the extra-territorial respon-
sibility of states outlined inter alia in Article 2 (1) of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Article 4 of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and Article 32 of the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
The establishment of a complaints mechanism shows 
not least that Germany wishes to be judged by stand-
ards that include human rights and good governance, 
the same standards that it demands from the coun-
tries with which it engages in development cooper-
ation. By establishing a complaints mechanism with 
a central, independent compliance review, Germany 
would be assuming a pioneering role in human rights 
in the face of an international trend towards a de-
mand for more accountability from donors. The annu-
al reports submitted by the BMZ to the Bundestag on 
the number and type of complaints received, which 
are then publically debated in the Committee for Eco-
nomic Cooperation together with the Committee for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid, would testify to 
this transparency and pioneering role. 
To the implementing agencies, the GIZ and KfW de-
velopment bank:
2 To make use of the opportunities offered by an 
independent complaints mechanism, to construc-
tively support its establishment and to expand their 
own internal confidential procedures as a prelude 
to this in line with international good practice.
A human rights complaints mechanism supports 
good-quality development cooperation: in partici-
pating in development projects in partner countries, 
German development cooperation organisations are 
subject to a multitude of influences –many of which 
are outside the control of the BMZ or the implemen-
tation agencies. Complaints can show where risks 
have become manifest and thus contribute to timely 
adjustments. 
The current standard procedure consists of two stag-
es: the first is carried out by those involved in the 
project in the field and focused on problem-solving; 
the second stage is a central independent compliance 
review. Whereas the first tends to have a mediative 
character and is confidential in nature, the second is 
an independent procedure whose steps are transpar-
ently documented. The first gives organisations the 
opportunity in dialogue with the participants to try 
to find a solution quickly and in good faith. The in-
dependent public procedure becomes relevant when 
the participants have failed to reach agreement or 
are unable to remedy the situation in any other way, 
because the human rights infringement is already ir-
reversible.
The existing procedures used by the GIZ and KfW 
should therefore be further developed as the first step 
in the two-stage procedure described above and guid-
ed by international good practice and the human rights 
obligations of Germany and its partner countries. 
However, an additional stage should be established 
independently of the implementation agencies. In 
cases where institutions in partner countries adopt a 
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wait-and-see attitude to such a mechanism, develop-
ment cooperation professionals would then be able 
to cite the fact that the complaints mechanism is an 
independent process and as such not part of their own 
organisation. 
To the Committee on Economic Cooperation and 
Development and the Committee on Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Aid in the German Bundestag:
3 To request an annual report from the Federal Min-
istry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
on complaints about development projects with 
German participation and to discuss this report in 
a public joint committee session. 
The German Bundestag has an important control func-
tion in development policy – when it decides on the 
allocation of budgetary aid, for example. It must take 
on this role with respect to concrete development pro-
jects and systematically address possible complaints. 
Accountability vis-à-vis the “taxpayer” and account-
ability to the population in the partner country can 
and should therefore be connected by means of par-
liamentary control. Since development cooperation 
must be able to react quickly and flexibly to politi-
cal and social changes, prior detailed parliamentary 
control of each separate programme is unsuitable, 
something for which ex post accountability of devel-
opment cooperation must compensate. 
Moreover, a public debate about human rights com-
plaints can make the opportunities and limitations 
of development cooperation more transparent and, 
in the long term, facilitate communication with civil 
society both at home and abroad.
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